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Abstract
The object of this paper is to reﬂect upon the
intersection of, and explore the interconnec-
tions between, globalization and higher educ-
ation. It outlines the essential characteristics of
globalization, with an analysis of its dimen-
sions and implications (in particular, exclu-
sion). It shows that, over the past three decades,
globalization has been associated with uneven
development and asymmetrical consequences
for both countries and people. This sets the
stage in the wider context of development. The
paper then develops an analytical framework to
consider how globalization relates to and inﬂu-
ences the world of higher education. It argues
that the retreat of the state and the advance of
the market have changed the national context,
and that the spread of markets is beginning to
exercise a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on higher educ-
ation. There are inherent dangers to such com-
mercialization, but there are also some
opportunities to learn from markets. This paper
also shows that the gathering momentum of
globalization, which has changed the internat-
ional context, is beginning to reshape higher
education. The associated globalization of
education has major positive and negative
implications for development. Markets and
globalization together could transform the
world of higher education. However, education
as business, particularly in universities, is not
conducive to economic development and social
progress. Therefore, countries should formulate
policies for higher education in the pursuit of
development, so as to minimize the dangers
and capture the opportunities created by mar-
kets and globalization.
INTRODUCTION
The spread of education in society is at the
foundations of success in countries that are late-
comers to development. The most striking
examples in recent history are the success sto-
ries in East Asia that are now perceived as role
models. Education is both a means and an end.
It is a means of raising levels of productivity
and mobilizing the most abundant resource in
economies – labour – for the purpose of devel-
opment. It is an end in so far as it makes a basic
contribution to improving the quality of life for
people as individuals and for society at large.
The essence of development, after all, is the
well-being of humankind. Development must
therefore provide ordinary people with the
rights, opportunities and capabilities they need
to exercise their own choices for a decent life.
Education is critical in every dimension. The
relative importance of its components may
change over time: from primary education and
adult literacy to vocational education, higher
education, technical education or professional
education. Nevertheless, investing in human
beings is always important, at every stage of
development. The returns to society may
accrue after a time lag but are always high. In
the quest for development, primary education
is absolutely essential because it creates the
base. Higher education is just as important,
however, for it provides the cutting edge. And
universities are the lifeblood of higher educ-
ation. Islands of excellence in professional
education or scientiﬁc research are valuable
complements but cannot replace universities,
which provide educational opportunities for
people at large. Such broad-based higher educ-
ation alone creates capabilities at a micro level
that provide the foundations of development at
the macro level. This is, perhaps, among the
most important lessons to emerge from the
experience of latecomers to industrialization
during the 20th century.1
In reﬂecting on the future at this conjunc-
ture, it is imperative to recognize that globaliz-
ation and markets are not only shaping the
process of development everywhere, but are
also transforming the world of higher education
at a pace that would have been difficult to imag-
ine just two decades ago. The retreat of the state
and the advance of the market have changed the
national context, while the spread of markets is
beginning to exercise a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on
higher education. At the same time, the gather-
ing momentum of globalization, which has
changed the international context, is beginning
to reshape higher education. Markets and glob-
alization together have the potential to bring
about profound changes in higher education,
which could be negative or positive, but education as a
business concern cannot be conducive to development.
The object of this paper is to reﬂect upon the intersection
of, and explore the interconnections between, globalizat-
ion and higher education in prospect, rather than retro-
spect, situated in the wider context of development.
The structure of this paper is as follows. The ﬁrst sec-
tion outlines the essential characteristics of globalization,
with an analysis of its dimensions and implications (in
particular, exclusion) to set the stage. The second section
considers the development experience of the world econ-
omy during the last quarter of the 20th century to show
that globalization is associated with uneven development
and asymmetrical consequences for both countries and
people. The third section develops an analytical frame-
work to consider how globalization relates to, or inﬂu-
ences, the world of higher education. The fourth section
examines what globalization means for higher education
in different spheres, with some reference to the implicat-
ions of markets and commercialization for universities.
The ﬁfth section focuses on the globalization of higher
education and discusses its consequences for both people
and education in the development process. In conclusion,
the ﬁnal section addresses a question that is simple
enough to pose but difficult to answer: what is to be done?
GLOBALIZATION: DIMENSIONS AND
IMPLICATIONS
Globalization means different things to different people.
What is more, the word globalization is used in two ways,
which is a source of some confusion. It is used in a pos-
itive sense to describe a process of integration into the
world economy, and in a normative sense to prescribe a
strategy of development based on a rapid integration with
the world economy. 
Even its characterization, however, is by no means
uniform. It can be described, simply, as an expansion of
economic activities across national boundaries. There are
three economic manifestations of this phenomenon –
international trade, international investment and internat-
ional ﬁnance – which also constitute its cutting edge. But
there is much more to globalization. It is about the expan-
sion of economic transactions and the organization of
economic activities across the political boundaries of
nation-states. More precisely, it can be deﬁned as a
process associated with increasing economic openness,
growing economic interdependence and deepening eco-
nomic integration in the world economy. 
Economic openness is not simply conﬁned to trade
ﬂows, investment ﬂows and ﬁnancial ﬂows. It also
extends to ﬂows of services, technology, information and
ideas across national boundaries. But the cross-border
movement of people is closely regulated and highly
restricted. Economic interdependence is asymmetrical.
There is a high degree of interdependence among coun-
tries in the industrialized world. There is considerable
dependence of developing countries on industrialized
countries. There is much less interdependence among
countries in the developing world. Economic integration
straddles national boundaries as liberalization has diluted
the signiﬁcance of borders in economic transactions. It is,
in part, an integration of markets (for goods, services,
technology, ﬁnancial assets and even money) on the
demand side, and, in part, an integration of production
(horizontal and vertical) on the supply side.
The gathering momentum of globalization has brought
about profound changes in the world economy, which are
clearly reﬂected in its three important dimensions: trade,
investment and ﬁnance.2 The second half of the 20th cen-
tury witnessed a phenomenal expansion in international
trade ﬂows. Consequently, an increasing proportion of
world output entered into world trade. The share of world
exports in world gross domestic product (GDP) rose from
6% in 1950 to 14.3% in 1975 and 20.2% in 2000. For the
industrialized countries, this proportion increased from
13.6% in 1975 to 16.7% in 2000. For the developing
countries, this proportion increased from 17.5% in 1975
to 31.2% in 2000. The story is almost the same for inter-
national investment ﬂows. The stock of foreign direct
investment in the world, as a proportion of world output,
increased from 4.4% in 1960 to 6.1% in 1980 and 20%
in 2000. Over the same period, world foreign direct
investment ﬂows as a proportion of world gross ﬁxed cap-
ital formation rose from 1.1% in 1960 to 2.3% in 1980
and 22% in 2000. The growth in international ﬁnance has
been explosive – so much so that, in terms of magnitudes,
trade and investment are now dwarfed by ﬁnance. The
expansion of international banking is phenomenal. The
international market for ﬁnancial assets has experienced
similar growth. There is a growing international market
for government bonds. The size of international foreign
exchange markets is staggering. Global foreign exchange
transactions have soared – from US$60 billion per day in
1983 to US$1.49 trillion per day in 1998. By comparison,
in 1997, world GDP was US$82 billion per day and world
exports were US$15 billion per day, while the foreign
exchange reserves of all central banks put together were
US$1.55 trillion.
Such aggregates do not reveal that the spread of glob-
alization is uneven. The exclusion of people and coun-
tries from the process is a fact of life. Consider some
ﬁgures, for 2000, on international trade, international
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investment and international ﬁnance, which constitute the
cutting edge of globalization.3 Industrialized countries
accounted for 64% of world exports, while developing
countries accounted for 32% and transitional economies
for the remaining 4%. Industrialized countries accounted
for 82% of foreign direct investment inﬂows in the world
economy, whereas developing countries accounted for
16% and transitional economies for the remaining 2%.
Industrialized countries accounted for 95% of cross-bor-
der mergers and acquisitions in terms of purchases,
whereas developing countries accounted for just 4% and
transitional economies for a mere 1%.
This sharp divide between rich and poor countries is
no surprise, but the spread of globalization is just as
uneven within the developing world. No more than a
dozen developing countries are an integral part of the
globalization process: Argentina, Brazil and Mexico in
Latin America; and China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia,
South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand
in Asia. During the 1990s, these countries accounted for
70% of total exports from the developing world and 75%
of manufactured exports from the developing world,
absorbed almost 72% of foreign direct investment ﬂows
to the developing world and received about 90% of for-
eign portfolio investment ﬂows to the developing world.4
Countries in sub-Saharan Africa and West Asia are sim-
ply not in the picture, and many countries in Latin Amer-
ica, South Asia and the Asia-Paciﬁc region are left out
altogether. The exclusion of the least developed countries,
everywhere in the world, is almost complete.
The exclusion of poor countries and people extends
beyond trade, investment and ﬁnance, in so far as their
access to globalization is exceedingly limited in terms of
communication and technology. Indeed, the excluded are
barely connected with the globalized world. For example,
in 2000, the distribution of internet access was most uneq-
ual: of the world’s internet users, 75.8% were in the indus-
trialized countries, 18.4% were in Asia, just 4.6% were
in Latin America and the Caribbean, and a mere 1.2%
were in Africa.5 Similarly, in 1999, the access to telecom-
munications systems was most unequal: there were
100–125 telephone lines per 100 inhabitants in the coun-
tries of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) compared with 25 telephone lines
per 100 inhabitants in the rest of the world. The differ-
ence was much greater in other modes. In the OECD
countries, for every 100 people, the number of personal
computers ranged from 25 to 30 while the number of
mobile phones ranged from 20 to 40. In the rest of the
world, the number of personal computers and mobile
phones per 100 people was less than 5.6 These are aver-
ages for the non-OECD world. Obviously, such access
was probably far less in most developing countries and
minimal in the least developed countries.
Globalization has, indeed, created opportunities for
some people and countries that were not even dreamed of
three decades ago. But it has also introduced new risks, if
not threats, for many others. It has been associated with
the deepening of poverty and the accentuation of inequal-
ities. The distribution of beneﬁts and costs is unequal.
There are some winners: more in rich countries than in
poor countries. There are many losers: numerous both in
rich countries and poor countries.7 It is perhaps necessary
to identify, in broad categories, the winners and the los-
ers. The asset-owners, proﬁt-earners, rentiers, the educ-
ated, the mobile and people with professional, managerial
or technical skills are the winners, whereas the asset-less,
the wage-earners, the debtors, the uneducated, the immo-
bile, the semi-skilled and the unskilled are the losers.8
At the same time, globalization has introduced a new
dimension to the exclusion of people from development.
Exclusion is no longer simply about the inability to satisfy
basic human needs in terms of food, clothing, shelter,
healthcare and education for large numbers of people. It
is much more complicated. The consumption patterns and
lifestyles of the rich associated with globalization have
powerful demonstration effects. People everywhere, even
the poor and the excluded, are exposed to these consump-
tion possibility frontiers because electronic media have
spread the consumer message far and wide. This creates
both expectations and aspirations. But the simple fact of
life is that those who do not have the incomes cannot buy
goods and services in the market. Thus, when the paradise
of consumerism is unattainable – which is the case for
common people – it only creates frustration or alienation.
The reaction of people who experience such exclusion dif-
fers. Some seek short cuts to the consumerist paradise
through drugs, crime or violence. Some seek refuge in eth-
nic identities, cultural chauvinism or religious fundamen-
talism. Such traditional or indigenous values are often the
only thing that poor people can assert to bring identity and
meaning to their lives. Outcomes do not always take these
extreme forms, but globalization inevitably tends to erode
social stability.9 Thus, economic integration with the out-
side world may accentuate social tensions or provoke
social fragmentation within countries. 
In this context, it is essential to recognize that econom-
ics provides a critical but limited perspective on global-
ization, which is a multidimensional phenomenon. It
extends far beyond the economy to polity and society. It
would be no exaggeration to say that the whole is differ-
ent from, and possibly greater than, the sum total of its
parts. The multiple dimensions – political, social and cul-
tural – deserve mention, even if brieﬂy.
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In the political dimension, the momentum of global-
ization is such that the power of national governments is
being reduced through incursions into hitherto sovereign
economic or political space, without a corresponding
increase in effective international cooperation or supra-
national government to regulate or govern this market-
driven process.10 Simply put, there is a mismatch
between economies that are global and polities that are
national or local.11
In the social dimension, a market economy may be
seen as a necessary and indeed desirable attribute of glob-
alization, but the creation of a market society may not be
a desirable outcome. If the pursuit of material well-being
becomes a dominant and, for some, exclusive objective,
then the culture of materialism or simply the quest for
money might spread into all spheres of life. A reasonable
utilitarianism could then be transformed into Narcissist
hedonism. The norms and values that are the foundations
of civil society, in which individuals have an obligation to
society, could be eroded. Social norms and social instit-
utions, so essential for the market economy itself, could
be weakened.
In the cultural dimension, the global spread of cultural
impulses is at least as important as that of economic
impulses. Youth culture in cities everywhere, across the
world, is globalized, as manifested in jeans, T-shirts,
sneakers, jogging, fast food, pop music, Hollywood
movies, satellite television, 24/7 news channels, the inter-
net and so on. Consumerism is indeed global. Even cor-
ruption and crime have become similar everywhere. The
communications revolution and the electronic media have
played a key role in all this. But modernity and tradition
do not always mesh together, and this could plant seeds of
conﬂict in societies. What is more, the homogenization
of culture associated with globalization is not desirable,
for cultural diversity is as important as biodiversity. 
GLOBALIZATION: CONSEQUENCES FOR
DEVELOPMENT
The globalization process, which gathered momentum
during the last quarter of the 20th century, has brought
about profound changes in the international context. It
could have far-reaching implications for development.
The reality that has unfolded so far, however, belies the
expectations of ideologues. The development experience
of the world economy from the early 1970s to the early
2000s, which could be termed the age of globalization,
provides cause for concern, particularly when compared
with the period from the late 1940s to the early 1970s,
which has been described as the golden age of capital-
ism. Any such periodization is obviously arbitrary, but it
serves an analytical purpose.12
Growth did not accelerate. It slowed down. During
the 1960s, the average growth rate of world GDP per
capita was 3.5% per annum. Deceleration set in there-
after. The average growth rate of world GDP per capita
was 2.1% per annum during the 1970s, 1.3% per annum
during the 1980s and 1% per annum during the 1990s.13
This growth was more volatile than in the past, particul-
arly in the developing world.14 It was also unevenly dis-
tributed across countries. Between 1985 and 2000, the
growth in GDP per capita was negative in 23 developing
countries, 0.2% per annum in 14 developing countries,
1.2% per annum in 20 developing countries, 2.2% per
annum in 12 developing countries, and more than 5% per
annum in just 16 developing countries. Over the same
period, growth in GDP per capita was negative in 17
transition countries and 1.8% per annum in 22 industrial-
ized countries. 
Available ﬁgures suggest divergence, rather than con-
vergence, in income levels between countries and
between people. Economic inequalities increased in the
late 20th century as the income gap widened between rich
and poor countries, between the rich and the poor in the
world’s population, and also between rich and poor peo-
ple within countries. The ratio of GDP per capita in the
20 richest countries to GDP per capita in the poorest 20
countries of the world rose from 54:1 during the period
1960–1962 to 121:1 during the period 2000–2002.15 The
income gap between people has also widened over time.
The ratio of the average GNP per capita in the richest
quintile of the world’s population to that of the poorest
quintile of the world’s population rose from 31:1 in 1965
to 60:1 in 1990 and 74:1 in 1997.16 Income distribution
within countries also worsened. This is borne out by a
study on trends in income distribution from the 1960s to
the 1990s for 73 countries comprising developed, devel-
oping and transitional economies. It shows that income
inequality increased in 48 countries, which account for
59% of the population and 78% of the PPP-GDP in the
sample of 73 countries. Income inequality remained the
same in 16 countries, which account for 36% of the pop-
ulation and 13% of the PPP-GDP in the sample of 73
countries. Income inequality decreased in just 9 countries,
which account for 5% of the population and 9% of the
PPP-GDP in the sample of 73 countries.17 The increase
in income inequality was striking in some industrialized
countries. Between 1975 and 2000, the share of the rich-
est 1% in gross income rose from 8% to 17% in the USA,
from 8.8% to 13.3% in Canada and from 6.1% to 13% in
the UK.18
The incidence of poverty increased in most countries
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of Latin America, the Caribbean and sub-Saharan Africa
during the 1980s and 1990s. Much of Eastern Europe and
Central Asia experienced a sharp rise in poverty during
the 1990s. However, East Asia, Southeast Asia and South
Asia experienced a steady decline in the incidence of
poverty during this period. Most of this improvement,
however, is attributed to changes in just two countries
with large populations (China and India).19
The employment situation during the last quarter of
the 20th century provides a sharp contrast with the pre-
ceding quarter century, during which full employment
was almost the norm in industrialized countries. Unem-
ployment in industrialized countries has increased sub-
stantially since the early 1970s and has remained at high
levels since then. During the 1980s and 1990s, the unem-
ployment rate was in the range of 10% in the European
Union and about 7% in the OECD countries. The excep-
tion is the United States, where the unemployment rate
remains around 5%. In contrast, Japan has witnessed a
sharp increase in the unemployment rate from near zero
to more than 5%.20 In developing countries, employment
creation in the organized sector continues to lag behind
growth in the labour force, so that an increasing propor-
tion of workers are dependent upon low-productivity and
casual employment in the informal sector. Inequality in
terms of wages and incomes has registered an increase
almost everywhere in the world. This has been associated
with an increasing casualization of the workforce:
employment opportunities in the organized sector have
stagnated, so labour absorption is possible largely in the
informal sector of economies.
It would seem that globalization is characterized by
uneven development. For a few rich countries and rich
people, it has led to prosperity. For many poor countries
and poor people, it has led to marginalization if not exclu-
sion. The beneﬁts have accrued essentially to the indus-
trialized world and a small number of developing
countries. For many developing countries and their peo-
ple, the process of integration with the world economy
has not yielded beneﬁts in terms of economic growth or
poverty reduction, either because they did not create the
necessary preconditions or because the process of integ-
ration was too rapid. The least developed countries and
their people have simply been marginalized and almost
excluded from the process.
In retrospect, it is apparent that globalization has been
associated with simultaneous, yet asymmetrical, conseq-
uences for countries and people. There is inclusion for
some and exclusion or marginalization for many. There
is affluence for some and poverty for many. There are
some winners and many losers. The celebrated economist
Joan Robinson once said: ‘There is only one thing that is
worse than being exploited by capitalists. And that is not
being exploited by capitalists.’Much the same can be said
about markets and globalization, which may not ensure
prosperity for everyone but may, in fact, exclude a signif-
icant proportion of people.21
It would seem that globalization has created two
worlds that co-exist in space even if they are far apart in
well-being. For some, in a world more interconnected
than ever before, globalization has opened the door to
many beneﬁts. Open economies and societies are con-
ducive to innovation, entrepreneurship and wealth cre-
ation. Better communications, it is said, have enhanced
awareness of rights and identities, just as they have
enabled social movements to mobilize opinion. For many,
the fundamental problems of poverty, unemployment and
inequality persist. Of course, these problems existed
before, but globalization may have accentuated exclusion
and deprivation, for it has dislocated traditional liveli-
hoods and local communities. It also threatens environ-
mental sustainability and cultural diversity. Better
communications, it is said, have enhanced awareness of
widening disparities. Everybody sees the world from the
viewpoint of their own lives. Therefore, perceptions
about globalization depend on who you are, what you do
and where you live. Some focus on the beneﬁts and the
opportunities. Others focus on the costs and the dangers.
Both are right in terms of what they see. But both are
wrong in terms of what they do not see.
On balance, it is clear that both countries and people
suffer from exclusion.22 Too many people in poor coun-
tries, particularly in rural areas and the informal sector,
are marginalized if not excluded. Too few share in the
beneﬁts. Too many have no voice in its design or inﬂu-
ence on its course. There is a growing polarization
between the winners and the losers. The gap has widened
between rich and poor countries, between rich and poor
in the world’s population, and also between rich and poor
people within countries. These mounting imbalances in
the world are ethically unacceptable and politically
unsustainable.23
TOWARDS AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
An obvious question arises. How can this globalization
process relate to, let alone inﬂuence, the world of higher
education? The simple answer lies in two factors under-
lying the process of globalization. For one, globalization
is driven by market forces – whether the threat of com-
petition or the lure of proﬁts. For another, globalization
is driven by the technological revolution in transport and
communications, which has set aside geographical barri-
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ers so that distance and time matter little. Economic
analysis also enables us to provide a more complete and
analytical answer.
In any economy, education is an integral part of the
social infrastructure and an essential component of social
consumption. Until not so long ago, most education was
produced and consumed within national boundaries. It
was what economists describe as ‘non-traded’. In this
attribute, education in general and higher education in
particular were not signiﬁcantly different from services
as distinct from goods. Services possess two unique char-
acteristics. First, the production of a service and its con-
sumption are, as a rule, simultaneous, because services
cannot be stored. Second, the producer and the consumer
of a service must interact with each other, because the
delivery of a service requires physical proximity. 
In principle, it is possible to make a distinction
between traded services, non-traded services and tradable
services. In the world we knew just a quarter of a century
ago, education was essentially non-traded across borders.
But globalization has changed the world since then. The
distinction between traded, non-traded and tradable ser-
vices, which was always far from clear, has become more
blurred on account of rapid technical progress and the
changes in organization and production that the world
economy witnessed during the late 20th century.
Trade in services may be deﬁned as international trans-
actions in services between the residents of one country
and the residents of another country, irrespective of where
the transaction takes place. International trade in services
so deﬁned can be divided into four categories:
1. those in which the producer moves to the consumer; 
2. those in which the consumer moves to the producer; 
3. those in which either the producer or the consumer
moves to the other; and 
4. those in which neither the consumer nor the producer
moves to each other.24
In the ﬁrst three categories, physical proximity of the pro-
ducer and the consumer is essential for the international
service transaction to take place. This is in conformity
with the characteristics of services. In the fourth categ-
ory, however, such physical proximity is not necessary
and international trade in services is similar to internat-
ional trade in goods. 
Conventional examples of international trade in ser-
vices ﬁt into each of these categories. Guest workers,
body shopping,25 hotel chains and department stores are
examples of situations in which the producer of a service
moves to its consumers. Tourism provides the most obvi-
ous example of situations in which the consumer of a ser-
vice moves to the producer. Higher education is the other
traditional example, as students from all over the world
move to study at Harvard or MIT in the US and at Oxford
or Cambridge in the UK. Entertainers, performing artists
and professional athletes provide examples of situations
in which either the producer moves to the consumer or
the consumer moves to the producer. Traditional bank-
ing, shipping and insurance services provide examples of
situations in which neither the consumer nor the producer
moves to the other, as these services can be disembodied
from the producer and transported to the consumer.
Over the past two decades, there has been a discernible
increase in the possibilities for international trade in ser-
vices, without any perceptible decrease in the degree of
restrictions on such trade, which is attributable to techno-
logical change on the one hand and a near-revolution in
transport on the other.26 Taken together, these develop-
ments have had the following consequences: ﬁrst, non-
traded services have become tradable; second, some
altogether new services have entered the realm of inter-
national transactions; and third, the possibilities for trade
in erstwhile traded services have become much larger.
The technological revolution in transport and commun-
ications has made hitherto non-traded services tradable,
either by a dramatic reduction in the cost of transport,
which increases the mobility of the producer and the con-
sumer of a service, or by developing means of commun-
ication, such as satellite links or video transmissions,
which eliminate the need for proximity between the pro-
ducer and the consumer of a service. At the same time,
the revolution in telecommunications and information
technologies has created an altogether new species of
traded services. 
These developments have transformed not only the
possibilities but also the realities of higher education
transactions across national boundaries. For a long time,
as a service, higher education was tradable in one categ-
ory alone – where the consumer of a service moved to the
producer – as students from different parts of the world
went to study in premier universities, mostly in industrial
societies. Of course, there is a rapid expansion and diver-
siﬁcation of this process in terms of student numbers and
geographical spread. But that is not all. Cross-border
higher education transactions have entered each of the
other three categories: 
1. those in which the producer moves to the consumer,
as universities, particularly those in English-speaking
industrial societies, have established campuses in dif-
ferent parts of the world;
2. those in which either the producer or the consumer
moves to each other, as universities run short courses
or summer schools either on their own campuses or in
facilities leased in students’ home countries; and
3. those in which neither the producer nor the consumer
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moves to each other, as distance education, satellite
television and open courseware dispense with the
need for physical proximity between the teacher and
the taught. 
IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION ON HIGHER
EDUCATION
The spread of markets and the momentum of globalizat-
ion during the past two decades have transformed the
world of higher education almost beyond recognition.
Market forces, driven by the threat of competition or the
lure of proﬁt, have led to the emergence of higher educ-
ation as business. The technological revolution has led
to a dramatic transformation in distance education as a
mode of delivery. This is discernible not simply in the
national context, but also in the international context,
with a rapid expansion of cross-border transactions in
higher education. It is clear that markets and globalizat-
ion are transforming the world of higher education. The
ways and means of providing higher education are
changing. But the process does not stop there. Markets
and globalization are shaping the content of higher educ-
ation and inﬂuencing the nature of institutions that prov-
ide higher education.
In reﬂecting on the content, it is appropriate to make a
distinction between higher education, professional educ-
ation and distance education. These are neither mutually
exclusive nor exhaustive, but the distinction is useful for
analytical purposes.
In the world of higher education, markets and global-
ization are beginning to inﬂuence universities and shape
education, not only in terms of what is taught but also of
what is researched. In the sphere of teaching, there is a
discernible departure from the liberal intellectual tradit-
ion in which education was about learning across the
entire spectrum of disciplines. Students’ choices were
shaped by their interests. There was never perfect sym-
metry. Even so, universities endeavoured to strike a bal-
ance across disciplines, whether literature, philosophy,
languages, economics, mathematics, physics or life sci-
ences. But this is changing, as students and parents dis-
play a strong preference for higher education that makes
young people employable. The popularity and availabil-
ity of courses are thus being shaped by markets. Student
employability is not simply a force that is pushing to cre-
ate more places for vocational courses in higher educ-
ation. It is also inducing universities to introduce new
courses for which there is a demand in the market,
because these translate into lucrative fees as a major
source of income. Similarly, markets are beginning to
exercise an inﬂuence on the research agenda of universi-
ties: resources for research in life sciences, medicine,
engineering and economics are abundant, while resources
for research in philosophy, linguistics, history and literat-
ure are scarce. There is a premium on applied research
and a discount on theoretical research. 
The world of professional education is also being
inﬂuenced by markets and globalization. The obvious
examples are engineering, management, medicine and
law. Markets exercise some (albeit limited) inﬂuence on
curricula. Furthermore, globalization is encouraging the
harmonization of academic programmes. The reason is
simple. These professions are becoming increasingly
internationalized. Therefore, the context is more global
and less national, let alone local.
The world of distance education is somewhat differ-
ent and could provide a silver lining to the cloud. Market
forces and technical progress have opened up a new
world of opportunities in higher education for those who
missed the opportunity when they ﬁnished school or did
not have access earlier. Of course, these opportunities
come at a price that may not be affordable for some, par-
ticularly in developing countries or transition economies.
All this suggests that globalization is changing the
form and shaping the content of higher education. At the
same time, markets are beginning to inﬂuence the nature
and culture of universities, which are the most important
institutions in higher education.
There is a discernible commercialization of universi-
ties, although it is at its early stages and has not yet spread
everywhere. Even so, it is important to analyse the under-
lying factors.27 The process began with the resource
crunch in governments that led to a ﬁnancial squeeze on
universities. It coaxed universities into searching for alter-
native sources of income. Entrepreneurial talents, which
were rewarded by the market and admired by some in
society, legitimized such initiatives in universities. The
importance of traditional academic values diminished as
competition among universities for scarce resources
intensiﬁed. This sequence of developments came to be
juxtaposed with the emergence of a wide range of oppor-
tunities for universities to earn money in the marketplace,
based on their comparative advantage in knowledge with
enormous potential for applications in management and
technology. 
Such commercialization has been reinforced by the
forces of supply and demand. On the demand side, there
is a burgeoning desire for higher education that is driven
by a combination of individual aspirations and corporate
needs in a changed national and international context. On
the supply side, higher education almost everywhere is
dominated by large public universities, which are some-
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what inefficient and resistant to change. The safeguards
implicit in academic freedom and the security guaranteed
by tenure appointments, taken together, often create sit-
uations in which professors and administrators are not
quite accountable to students, let alone to society. In
developing countries, the problem is compounded
because the opportunities for higher education in public
institutions are simply not enough.
If we read between the lines, the situation in higher
education is not very different from that of the healthcare
sector before the advent of private enterprise. Unless cor-
rections are introduced, the world of higher education
might be caught in a pincer movement. At one end, the
commercialization of universities means business in
education. At the other end, the entry of private players
into higher education means education as business. There
are inherent dangers to such commercialization, but there
are also opportunities to learn from markets.28 It is clear
that dangers and opportunities are closely intertwined in
this process of change. These emerging realities cannot
be ignored because the world of higher education is at
some risk. The culture of markets and the advent of com-
mercialization could erode both values and morality,
which are the lifeblood of higher education. 
GLOBALIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION
There can be little doubt that the globalization process is
exercising a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the world of higher
education. But that is not all. At the same time, there is a
globalization of higher education, which, in turn, has sig-
niﬁcant implications. It has implications for people and
countries, as well as for higher education and develop-
ment. Let us consider each in turn.
In considering what the spread of globalization into
higher education could mean for people and countries,
there are three important manifestations worth noting.29
First, the globalization of education has gathered
momentum. This has two dimensions. The proportion of
foreign students studying for professional degrees or doc-
torates in the university system of the major industrial-
ized countries – in particular the USA– is large, and more
than two-thirds of these students simply stay on. The sit-
uation is similar in Europe, albeit on a smaller scale. At
the same time, centres of excellence in higher education
in labour-exporting developing countries are increasingly
adopting curricula that conform to international patterns
and standards. Given the facility of language, such peo-
ple are employable almost anywhere.
Second, the mobility of professionals has registered a
phenomenal increase in the age of globalization. It began
with the brain drain. It was facilitated by immigration
laws in the USA, Canada and Australia that encouraged
the entry of people with high skills or professional qual-
iﬁcations. This process has intensiﬁed and diversiﬁed. It
is, of course, still possible for scientists, doctors, engi-
neers and academics to emigrate. But more and more pro-
fessionals – such as lawyers, architects, accountants,
managers, bankers and those specializing in computer
software and information technology – can emigrate per-
manently, live abroad temporarily, or stay at home and
travel frequently for business. These people are almost as
mobile across borders as capital.
Third, the reach and spread of transnational corpor-
ations is worldwide. In the past, they moved goods, ser-
vices, technology, capital and ﬁnance across national
boundaries. Increasingly, however, they have also
become transnational employers of people. They place
expatriate managers in industrialized and developing host
countries. They recruit professionals from both industrial-
ized countries and developing countries for placement in
corporate headquarters or affiliates elsewhere. In devel-
oping countries, they engage local staff who acquire skills
and experience that make them employable abroad after
a time. They move immigrant professionals of foreign
origin, permanently settled in the industrialized world, to
run subsidiaries or affiliates in their countries of origin.
They engage professionals from low-income countries,
particularly in software but also in engineering and
healthcare, to work on a contract basis on special non-
immigrant status visas, a practice that has come to be
known as ‘body shopping’. This intra-ﬁrm mobility
across borders easily spills over into other forms of inter-
national labour mobility.
The professionals at the top of the skills ladder are
almost as mobile as capital. Indeed, we can think of them
as globalized people who are employable almost any-
where in the world – and the world, so to speak, is their
oyster. In a sense, it is a part of the secession of the suc-
cessful. The story is similar but not the same for contract
workers or those involved in body shopping, for they are
somewhere in the middle of the skills ladder. In both
cases, however, the globalization of higher education has
made this possible. Nevertheless, there is a crucial asym-
metry. The investment is made by the home countries.
The returns accrue to the host countries. This process is
associated with the privatization of beneﬁts and the
socialization of costs. For the home countries of these
people, there is an externalization of beneﬁts and an inter-
nalization of costs.
The World Trade Organization (WTO) regime and the
General Agreement on Trade in Services have major
implications for higher education that need careful con-
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sideration. This multilateral framework embodies the
most-favoured-nation clause and the national treatment
provision. The right of establishment, or commercial
presence, for service providers is also integrated into the
agreement. This is not yet universalized, but allows for
sector-by-sector negotiations. Higher education is on the
agenda. A multilateral regime of discipline for internat-
ional trade in higher education services is therefore on the
anvil. A discussion of higher education in the context of
the WTO would be too much of a digression, but I would
like to highlight two possible implications and conseq-
uences for higher education in the wider context of devel-
opment that relate to the quality and nature of education.
In developing countries, the globalization of higher
education is inﬂuencing the quality of education in two
ways. There is a striking proliferation of sub-standard
institutions charging high fees and providing poor educ-
ation. There is little if any accountability to students
because, in most developing countries, there are no con-
sumer protection laws or regulators for this market. Such
an adverse selection of service providers in higher educ-
ation is a real problem. Of course, there are some good
institutions entering the domain of providing higher educ-
ation across borders, but these are few and far between.
Unfortunately, even these institutions are susceptible to
the practice of double standards: the global and the local.
It might be unfair to cite examples, but it would be instruc-
tive to compare the academic content and standards of the
programmes run by such reputable institutions through
campuses at home, through distance education and on
campuses abroad. Clearly, unfettered markets without
established regulators in higher education are bound to
have an adverse effect on the quality of education.
The globalization of higher education is also chang-
ing the nature of higher education in the developing
world. Its links with and relevance to the society in which
the higher education is provided are somewhat tenuous,
because its content and scope are determined in industrial
societies. What is more, there is a clear and present dan-
ger that an internationalized higher education system may
stiﬂe rather than develop domestic capabilities in the
higher education systems of the developing world, par-
ticularly in the least developed countries.
CONCLUSION
In a world of unequal economic and social opportunities,
higher education provides the only means of faring bet-
ter, whether we think of people or of countries. Theory
and evidence both suggest that the development of a
physical and social infrastructure, particularly in educ-
ation, creates the necessary initial conditions for a country
to maximize the beneﬁts and minimize the costs of integ-
rating with the world economy in the process of global-
ization. Thus, for countries that are latecomers to
industrialization and development, a premature, passive,
market-driven insertion into the world economy, without
creating the initial conditions, is fraught with risk. It is
not just about an unequal distribution of costs and ben-
eﬁts between people and between countries. The spread
of education in society is critical. So is the creation of cap-
abilities among people. In this, higher education provides
the cutting edge. It is at the foundations of development
in countries that are latecomers to industrialization. This
is the essential lesson that emerges from the success sto-
ries of Asia in the second half of the 20th century.
At the beginning of the 21st century, it is clear that the
wealth of nations and the well-being of humankind will
depend, to a signiﬁcant extent, on ideas and knowledge.
In the past, land, natural resources, labour skills, capital
accumulation and technical progress were the sources of
economic growth and economic prosperity. In the future,
knowledge is bound to be critical in the process of eco-
nomic growth and social progress. Without corrections,
the widening gap between the haves and the have-nots
could then be transformed into a widening gap between
the ‘knows’ and the ‘know-nots’.
The most appropriate conclusion is provided by an old
Buddhist proverb: ‘The key to the gate of heaven is also
the key that could open the gate to hell.’Markets and glob-
alization provide a mix of opportunities and dangers for
higher education. I have not provided an answer to the
question I posed at the outset: what is to be done? How-
ever, a simple prescription would be appropriate. We
should not allow markets and globalization to shape higher
education. Instead, we should shape our agenda for higher
education so that we can capture the opportunities and
avoid the dangers unleashed by markets and globalization. 
NOTES
1 See, for example, Amsden (1989) and Wade (1990).
2 For a more detailed discussion, as also for sources of the ﬁg-
ures cited in this paragraph, see Nayyar (2006).
3 For ﬁgures on the share of country groups in world exports,
see UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report 2003. For
ﬁgures on the share of country groups in foreign direct
investment inﬂows, as well as cross-border mergers and
acquisitions, see UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2002.
4 The share of these 12 countries in total exports and manu-
factured exports from developing countries is calculated
from data in UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2002. Their
share in foreign direct investment inﬂows to the developing
world is calculated from data in the UNCTAD World Invest-
ment Report 2002. The ﬁgures on the share of these 12
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countries in portfolio investment ﬂows to the developing
world refer to the period 1992–1997 and are drawn from
UNCTAD, World Investment Report 1998, p. 15.
5 The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) reports
that, in 2000, the number of internet users in the world was
distributed as follows: 137 million in North America, 110.8
million in Europe, 38 million in Japan, 8.2 million in Aus-
tralia/New Zealand, 71.3 million in Asia, 17.7 million in
Latin America and the Caribbean, and 4.6 million in Africa.
6 See Observatoire de la Finance and UNITAR, Economic
and Financial Globalization: What the Numbers Say, New
York and Geneva, 2003, p. 23.
7 For a critical perspective on the implications of globalizat-
ion for development, see Stiglitz (2002), Nayyar (2003) and
Kaplinsky (2005). See also World Commission on the
Social Dimension of Globalization (2004).
8 For a more detailed discussion, see Nayyar (2003).
9 This argument about reactions in the form of chauvinism or
fundamentalism is set out by Streeten (1996), who also cites
Benjamin Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld, Random House, New
York, 1995, on this issue. The hypothesis that there are
actual or potential sources of tension between global mar-
kets and social stability is developed, at some length, by
Rodrik (1997).
10 For a discussion on the intersection between the economic
and the political in the context of global governance, see
Nayyar (2002a).
11 Cf. World Commission on the Social Dimension of Global-
ization (2004). 
12 The quarter century that followed the Second World War
was a period of unprecedented prosperity for the world
economy. It has, therefore, been described as the golden age
of capitalism. See, for example, Marglin and Schor (1990)
and Maddison (1982). The age of globalization, however,
is not a phrase that has been used in the literature to describe
the world economy during the last quarter of the 20th cen-
tury. It was suggested in an earlier paper by the author (Nay-
yar, 2003), as this periodization facilitates comparison. 
13 For the ﬁgures on growth rates in GDP per capita cited in
this paragraph, see Nayyar (2006).
14 For ﬁgures on the volatility of growth in the world economy
during the period 1975–2000, see World Bank, World
Development Indicators 2003. For ﬁgures on the volatility
of growth in developing countries during the period
1980–2000, as compared with the period 1960–1980, see
UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report 2003, p. 59.
15 From 1960–1962 to 2000–2002, in constant 1995 US dol-
lars, GDP per capita in the 20 richest countries rose from
11,417 to 32,339, while GDP per capita in the poorest 20
countries barely increased from 212 to 267 (World Bank,
World Development Indicators 2003).
16 For 1965 and 1990, these ratios are obtained from UNC-
TAD, Trade and Development Report 1997, p. 81. For 1997,
the ratio is obtained from UNDP, Human Development
Report 1999, p. 3.
17 See Cornia and Kiiski (2001).
18 See Atkinson (2003).
19 For supporting evidence, see World Bank, World Develop-
ment Report and Global Economic Prospects, various issues.
20 Cf. International Labour Organization (ILO), Global
Employment Trends and OECD, Employment Outlook, var-
ious issues.
21 For a more detailed discussion, see Nayyar (2007).
22 For a detailed discussion and ﬁgures, see Nayyar (2003) and
Nayyar (2006).
23 This proposition is set out, as also explained, in the Report
of the World Commission on the Social Dimension of Glob-
alization (2004). 
24 For an economic analysis of international trade in services,
see Nayyar (1988).
25 For example, the practice of engaging professionals from
low-income countries, particularly in software but also in
engineering and healthcare, to work on a contract basis on
special non-immigrant status visas.
26 See Nayyar (1988).
27 For a perceptive analysis and lucid discussion, see Bok
(2003).
28 For a more detailed discussion of dangers and opportunities,
see Bok (2003) and Nayyar (2008).
29 For an analysis of cross-border movements of people in a
globalizing world, see Nayyar (2002b).
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Introduction: Early concepts of human
and social development
The 4th century‚ BC Indian statesman and
philosopher Kautilya asserted: ‘In the happi-
ness of the people lies the legitimacy and the
happiness of the ruler’ (Kashyap, 2003). 
Almost 21 centuries later, during the
French Revolution, Jeremy Bentham (1907),
the brilliant English economist, was arguing
that the proper objective of a government is
to provide ‘the greatest happiness of the great-
est number [of its citizens]’. 
Under classical liberal economic theory,
happiness was already an economic measure-
ment used interchangeably with utility as well
as the general welfare. Classical liberal econo-
mists attempt to quantify happiness through
measurements of consumption and profits.
Since higher income could allow higher con-
sumption leading to more happiness, so
income per capita was used as the standard
measure for well-being and development. At
the national level, gross domestic product
(GDP) or its variant, gross national product
(GNP), was considered to be a measure for
development. It was soon found that this
measure was faulty for ignoring: 
 differences in domestic price levels 
 inequalities in the distribution of income
between different groups of people lead-
ing to group ‘unhappiness’ 
 allowance for military expenditure, pollu-
tion, social ills like crime, and the value of
leisure and consumer durables. 
Gradually, it was perceived that income and
economic growth cannot adequately capture
the complexity of human and social develop-
ment. As early as 1962 Simon Kuznets wrote
in The New Republic ‘The welfare of a nation
can scarcely be inferred from a measurement
of national income’ (Kuznets, 1962). The faster
the economy grows the more rapidly natural
resources are depleted, leading to scarcity, and
more fossil fuels are burnt, polluting the envir-
onment. Indicators covering health, education,
employment, housing, environment and basic
human rights are too important to be ignored. 
The ideas stemming from Richard Easterlin’s
work suggest that as economies get richer,
people can afford to question the need for fur-
ther riches (Easterlin, 1974) and, according to
Sen’s capability approach, people also needed
expanding capabilities or freedom to improve
their lot through better ‘doings’ and ‘beings’
(Sen, 1992). 
Adjusted income as a measure of social
and human development
GNP was adjusted for factors like leisure, under-
ground economy and environmental damage
and a ‘measure of economic welfare’ (MEW)
was adopted as being more realistic. Although
these adjustments were sensible, putting them
into numbers created serious problems. 
The United Nations Development Pro-
gramme developed another more acceptable
indicator, the Human Development Index (HDI)
which combines income, life expectancy, adult
literacy and school enrolment supplemented by
measures such as gender empowerment (Gen-
der-related Development Index (GDI) and the
Human Poverty Index (HPI). HDI scores are now
available for more than 170 countries. This has
also been criticized for failing to capture impor-
tant elements of the complexity of human well-
being (United Nations University, 2007). 
The Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI) has
been developed providing ‘explicit value to
[some of these complexities such as] environ-
mental quality, population health, livelihood
security, equity, free time and educational
attainment. It values unpaid voluntary and
household work as well as paid work’. It
counts sickness, crime, and pollution as costs
not gains’ (webmaster@gpiatlantic.org). GPI
incorporates 26 social, economic and environ-
mental variables. This indicator has been
endorsed by 400 eminent stakeholders,
including Nobel Laureates, as an important
step ‘in moving towards the society we want
to create’ (webmaster@gpiatlantic.org).
A new paradigm for social and human
development: the concept of subjective
well-being (SWB) and gross national
happiness
In recent years a paradigm shift has occurred in
the concept of development. All the indicators
mentioned above deal with objective meas-
ures of quantifiable characteristics. If achieve-
ment of happiness is the goal, subjective
assessment is necessary for measuring social
and human development, argue some devel-
opment specialists of today. 
The concept of social and human develop-
ment was moved forward from a subjective
point of view through the articulation of gross
national happiness (GNH) by the king of the
small Himalayan Kingdom of Bhutan in 1972.
That signalled the king’s commitment on
building the economy that would serve his
country’s unique culture based on Buddhist
spiritual values. The concept of GNH claims to
be based on the premise that true develop-
ment of human society takes place when mat-
erial and spiritual development occur side by
side to complement and reinforce each other.
The four pillars of GNH are the promotion of
equitable and sustainable socio-economic
development, preservation and promotion of
cultural values, conservation of the natural
environment and establishment of good gov-
ernance. During the past two decades
Bhutan’s development plan has been guided
by the principles of GNH. 
More recently, the economic and planning
ministers of the South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) adopted the
concept of GNH and its four pillars among the
principles and strategies for the eradication of
poverty in South Asia (Acharya, 2004). 
From a methodological point of view, it
should be noted that non-material compo-
nents of happiness cannot be measured objec-
tively. It is something in the minds of people
and consequently can be measured only by
asking questions in various contexts: clinical
interviews, life-review questionnaires and sur-
vey interviews. Questions can be posed in dif-
ferent ways: directly or indirectly with single or
multiple items.
Finally, the United Nations University has
recently published five volumes on human
well-being, which claim to correct many of the
pitfalls of the Human Development Index.
According to the authors, ‘well-being’ is a
multi-dimensional concept embracing all
aspects of human life: economic, freedom to
achieve valuable ‘doings’ and ‘beings’, health,
education, employment, housing, good envir-
onment, human security and basic human
rights. The research behind the volumes makes
a case for using information about people’s
perceptions or satisfactions to make policy
choices, and considers future directions for
participatory processes in well-being research.
The research also reconfirms that ‘happiness is
not always closely associated with income or
health: wealthier people are not necessarily
happier’ (United Nations University, 2007).
Box I.1 Rethinking human and social development: the perspective of Gross National Happiness1
